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Abstract: We examine whether contractors with cost plus contracts earn a higher profit, and 
whether the higher profit is associated with cost shifting behavior, using a unique set of data of 
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plus contracts in some years and without in other years. We find their profitability significantly 
increases during the years that cost plus contracts are awarded. We also find that these firms 
exhibit greater discretionary expenditures during the years with cost plus contracts, relative to the 
years without, which is consistent with cost shifting behavior. However, effective monitoring 
through the Cost Accounting Standards helps mitigate such behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The U.S. government spends an enormous amount of money on public procurement. For 
example, the U.S. federal government reported $391.3 billion and $540.1 billion on procurement 
in the year 2005 and2010, respectively.
1
 Partially due to its significance in amount, popular 
opinions toward government procurement have been controversial. It is often believed that 
government contractors earn too high a profit at the tax payers’ expense, and the government 
does not provide enough monitoring to discipline the contractors. To respond to the growing 
dissatisfaction against federal contractors, President Obama has proposed and implemented a 
series of new initiatives to further tighten the requirements for federal contractors. One of these 
new measures is to move away from cost plus contracts while adopting more fixed price 
contracts (Michaels and Cole, 2009).  
  Fixed price and cost plus are the two most common types of procurement contracts 
offered by the U.S. federal government to procurement contractors.
2
 For a fixed price contract, a 
contractor provides a product or service to the government at a fixed price that is previously 
determined through the negotiation or bidding process. For a cost plus contract, the contract price 
is equal to a contractor’s cost to produce the product or service plus a profit margin. That is, with 
a cost plus contract, the government reimburses the contractor for its declared costs to fulfill the 
contract, and pays it an additional fee or profit rate according to the negotiation. Therefore, if 
offered a cost plus contract, a contractor has an incentive to inflate its reported costs to earn a 
higher profit. Specifically, the contractor could use accounting discretions to shift costs from 
                                                 
1
 See: http://www.usaspending.gov/ 
2
 In practice, there can be hybrids of both types of contracts. For example, Rogerson (1992) describes four common 
types of contracts employed by the U.S. Department of Defense: (1) pure fixed price (2) pure cost reimbursement 
(3) incentive fixed price (i.e realized costs are reimbursed up to a pre-specified threshold level) (4) incentive cost 
reimbursement (i.e. incentive fixed price contracts revert to pure cost reimbursement at a pre-specified threshold 
cost level). For our analysis, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the seller’s cost as cost plus. 
In sensitivity analysis we ensure our results are robust to this empirical choice.  
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other segments of its business to the government business. Cost plus contracts are therefore often 
considered as “abuse-prone.”  
 In this paper, we use a unique set of data to examine whether contractors with cost plus 
contracts earn a higher profit, and whether the higher profit is associated with cost shifting 
behavior. To control for other confounding exogenous factors, we identify firms that are awarded 
with cost plus contracts in some years and without in other years. We find their profitability 
significantly increases during the years that cost plus contracts are awarded. We also find that 
these firms exhibit greater discretionary expenditures during the years with cost plus contracts, 
relative to the years without, consistent with cost shifting behavior. However, effective 
monitoring through the Cost Accounting Standards seems to help mitigate such behavior.  
 A vast theoretical literature explores the issues of optimal contracts and information 
problems in procurement setting (Laffont and Tirole 1986; McAfee and McMillan 1986; 
Rogerson 1992; Rogerson 1994; etc.). Since the government cannot costlessly observe the true 
cost incurred by a contractor, the contractor with a cost plus contract can manipulate the reported 
cost through cost inflation or cost shifting. Specifically, Rogerson (1992) demonstrates that a 
government contractor could over-allocate overhead cost into government contracts, while 
under-allocate overhead cost into commercial contracts, to strategically shift cost from 
commercial business to government business. Further, with the presence of such informational 
asymmetry, a first best solution can never be achieved. In contrast, fixed price contracts do not 
lead to such distortion of incentives as the contractor fully captures any profit/loss earned under 
the fixed price, regardless of its real cost or reported cost.  
Empirical evidence on government contractors’ cost-shifting behavior has been scant, 
mainly due to the lack of data. Until 2004, information about which government contractors 
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received a cost plus contract was not publicly disclosed. A few empirical papers examine cost 
shifting and profitability among government contractors, but without differentiating the types of 
contracts. Thomas and Tung (1992) find evidence that department of defense contractors shift 
pension costs to the government. Lichtenberg (1992) finds government contractors earned excess 
profits on government contracts in the 1980s and suggests cost shifting as the reason. However, 
McGown and Vendrzyk (2002) hypothesize that a government contractor can only shift costs in 
a business segment with both government and commercial contracts. They fail to find significant 
differences in profitability between such business segments and their counterparts with only 
government or only commercial contracts. Therefore, they conclude that government contractors 
do not engage in cost shifting. 
Prior research has also examined cost shifting in other settings. For example, Eldenburg 
and Soderstrom (1996) find that hospitals are engaged in cost shifting among payors using data 
from hospitals in the state of Washington. The cost shifting practice they focus on involves the 
hospital managers purposefully biasing budgeted information. Eldenburg and Kallapur (1997) 
examine the hospitals’ response to a Medicare policy change in 1983. They find that the 
hospitals maximize their revenues by changing their patient mix and overhead . Eldenburg and 
Krishnan (2006) provide a comprehensive review on cost and incentive issues in the healthcare 
industry.  
 In this paper, we examine whether government contractors with cost plus contracts earn 
an unusually high profit; and if so, whether the high profitability is associated with cost shifting 
facilitated by accounting discretions. To address our research questions, we construct a database 
of 4.9 million federal procurement contracts (5,745 firm-years; 1,137 firms) between 2005 and 
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2010 from the Federal Procurement Data System website.
3
 For our main test, we identify U.S. 
publicly-traded government contractors that have been awarded with a cost plus contract in at 
least one year, and with only fixed price contracts in at least another one year during our sample 
period. The final sample consists of 258 firms, or 1,505 firm-years. This sample enables us to use 
the firm as its own control and mitigates concerns that firm characteristics drives differences in 
cost shifting and profitability. We find that our sample firms have greater discretionary 
expenditures as well as higher profitability during the years with cost plus contracts, relative to 
other years without cost plus contracts. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that 
government contractors that are awarded with cost plus contracts engage in cost shifting to 
obtain higher profits.  
In addition, we examine the effect of government monitoring through two cross-sectional 
tests. We identify contracts that are required to be compliant with the Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS). When contracts (both fixed and cost plus) are subject to CAS coverage, the firm is 
required to provide a detailed disclosure about the accounting policies used to determine CAS 
related costs, thus facing  increased monitoring efforts by the government to prevent cost 
shifting. We predict the association between cost plus contracts and profitability to decrease as 
the percentage of revenue subject to CAS increases. Our results are consistent with our 
predictions.  
 We conduct several sensitivity tests to rule out alternative explanations. First, we employ 
different samples to ensure our results are not sensitive to sample selection. For our main 
analysis, the firm serves as its own control, by using 1,505 firm-years (258 firms) with at least 
one year with a cost contract and one year without a cost contract over the sample period. Our 
results are robust to two alternative subsamples: (1) all contractors (5,745 firm-years, 1,137 
                                                 
3
 https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/ 
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firms) and (2) all contractors with at least one cost contract (2,201 firm-years, 383 firms). 
Second, for our main analyses, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the 
seller’s cost as cost plus. However, in practice contracts are often hybrids that fall in the 
spectrum between cost plus and fixed price. Our results are robust to using a sample which 
includes only pure fixed price and pure cost reimbursement.  
 Please note that our findings do not endorse the view that cost plus contracts should be 
reduced or even eliminated in government procurement. Different forms of contracts serve 
different purposes and different contracting environments. Prior research (citexxx) on optimal 
contract form demonstrates that factors such as project-specific risk, market competition, 
contractor characteristics, and trust, are critical in determining the contract form. For example, 
when the nature of a project is long-term and highly uncertain, the government is more likely to 
adopt cost plus contract to share risk. Same is true is when the contractor firm has low risk 
tolerance because it is young in age, small in size, and/or highly-leveraged. Fixed price contracts 
often imply higher risk for the contractor, thus applicable only when the project outcome is 
certain or when the contractor has high risk tolerance. Further, the informational rent earned by 
government contractors is inevitable when there is informational asymmetry. The government 
can never obtain the contractors’ true cost information because frequent audits are costly. The 
government must trade off the potential gains recovered from these audits and the monitoring 
cost. 
 Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we are the first paper that 
examines government procurement using contract-level data, which provides a cleaner setting 
than prior studies. McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) do not differentiate contract types and fail to 
find evidence of higher profitability for defense contractors. This result could be due to the fact 
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that, for our sample, only 4% of contracts are cost plus and only 37% of government contractors 
have cost plus contracts. Not differentiating the contract types could bias against finding 
differential profitability because only cost plus contracts provide an incentive to shift cost and 
increase profits. Further, McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) examine firms’ government segment 
profitability relative to commercial segment profitability. Before 1998 and the implementation of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 131, firms had more discretion in their segment 
reporting (Berger and Hann 2007) and could have had proprietary reasons to withhold reporting 
profitable segments. Thus, examining segment profitability also biases against finding 
differential profitability.  
Second, we examine research and development (R&D) expense and selling, general, and 
administrative (SG&A) expense as the expenditures used by contractors to shift costs. Thomas 
and Tung (1992) examine defense contractors and whether they shift pension costs across 
contracts and time to the government. They find evidence of cost shifting using pension costs. 
One difficulty in interpreting their results is that cost plus contracts could provide an incentive to 
increase promised pension cost benefits. Thus, their observed cost increase might be due to 
increasing promised pension payments rather than cost shifting. In contrast, R&D and SG&A are 
not susceptible to this criticism. Our results confirm that procurement contractors shift costs, 
consistent with Thomas and Tung (1992), and provides evidence on other types of expenditures 
used for cost shifting purposes besides pension costs.  
Third, we provide evidence that cost shifting is one explanation for the relatively higher 
profitability of government contractors. Lichtenberg (1992) finds excess profits on government 
contracts in the 1980s and suggests cost shifting as the explanation. McGowan and Vendrzyk 
(2002) do not examine cost shifting directly and infer from their segment profitability 
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comparisons that cost shifting is not a likely explanation for excess profitability. They suggest 
the result in Lichtenberg (1992) is likely due to other nonaccounting explanations. In contrast, 
we directly examine both cost shifting behavior and profitability. We find evidence that cost 
shifting is one explanation for relatively higher profitability.  
 Lastly, we are the first to provide evidence on the effectiveness of cost accounting 
standards. Our evidence suggests that cost accounting standards mitigate the positive association 
between cost plus contracts and profitability. When cost accounting standards apply to the 
contract, there is increased monitoring by the government and increased disclosure requirements 
about cost, which likely decrease the contractors ability to shift cost. Although our evidence 
sheds light on the benefits of cost accounting standards, we do not attempt to conclude on the 
tradeoff between the costs and benefits associated with these standards. The government must 
trade off the recovered gain from monitoring contractors with the cost of monitoring.  
2. Background and hypotheses development 
The contract terms under fixed price and cost plus contracts are different, which result in 
different incentives for the contractors. For a fixed price contract, the contractor provides a 
product or service to the government at a fixed price. For example, the department of homeland 
security contracts with Dell Inc. to buy laptop computers at a fixed price per unit. In most cases, 
no ex post renegotiation of the agreed upon price is permitted, therefore the government knows 
the final price before the project begins. Since the contract price is fixed, contract revenue is not 
sensitive to the seller’s cost of production. The seller bears the risk associated with any cost 
overruns associated with the project.  
 With cost plus contracts the contract revenue is sensitive to the seller’s cost. The contract 
revenue is equal to the seller’s cost to produce the product or service plus a fixed fee or 
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guaranteed profit margin. Thus the government does not know the final price before the project 
begins and bears the risk of any cost overruns. Generally, when the costs are difficult to estimate 
ex ante or when the product or service is hard to explicitly define ahead of time the government 
may have incentives to offer a cost plus contract. For example, an aerospace firm contracts with 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to build a rocket propulsion unit. 
For the aerospace company to produce the unit, they need to make a transaction specific 
investment in technology and human capital specifically tied to producing the rocket propulsion 
unit because the product is highly specialized and only in demand by NASA. From the aerospace 
firms perspective engaging in this transaction under a fixed price contract is perhaps too risky 
given the required amount of investment and the inherent uncertainty and complexity of the 
project. To appropriately share risk and incentivize the aerospace firm to make the requisite 
amount of investment, NASA would likely have to offer a cost plus contract and bear the risk of 
any cost overruns.  
Under cost plus contracts, contractors have incentives to shift costs to the government 
whereas under fixed price contracts they generally do not. Obviously, if incurred costs were 
observable, there could be no cost shifting, the government would reimburse the contractor for 
expenditures incurred only for the contracted project. However, when there is information 
asymmetry between the contractor and the government, the true cost information is difficult to 
verify. Popular opinion often holds that cost plus contracts enable the contractors to cost shift 
and help the contractors earn a higher profitability. Since the contractor’s revenue increases in 
the cost reimbursed, the contractor’s profit will be higher when it shifts other cost to the 
government contracts. Specifically, if a firm receives cost plus contracts in some years and fixed 
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price contracts in others, its profitability could vary across years due to the differential 
availability of cost shifting based on contract type. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Government procurement contractors’ profitability is higher in years with a cost 
plus contract relative to years without cost plus contracts.  
 
 Thomas and Tung (1992) point out that contractor firms can shift costs both inter-
contract and inter-time. With inter-contract shifting, firms shift cost from non-cost plus contracts 
(e.g., private sector or fixed price government contracts) to cost plus contracts within the same 
contract period. For example, a firm spends a total of $100 million on R&D expenditures and 
reports $100 million in R&D expense on the income statement. Out of $100 million, $20 million 
is incurred for the government contract and $80 million was for the rest of the commercial 
business. However, the contractor firm could shift $5 million of R&D expenses from commercial 
business to the government project. Therefore, the government must reimburse the firm $25 
million for its R&D expenses, while the firm’s commercial section gets “subsidized” by $5 
million. Empirically, it is difficult to observe inter-contract cost shifting because in both cases 
the firm reports $100 million in R&D expense on the income statement.  
 With inter-period shifting, firms shift costs into contract periods with a cost plus contract 
from periods without a cost plus contract. For example, a firm spends a total of $100 million on 
R&D expenditures. Let us again assume the contractor firm should incur $20 million of R&D 
expenses on the government project. With inter-period cost shifting the firm could purposefully 
engage in more R&D activities than necessary to fulfill the government contract, and these 
research activities could benefit its commercial business in the future. If the incremental expense 
amounts to an additional $5 million in R&D costs, the government ends up subsidizing the 
contractor’s commercial business by overpaying $5 million dollars. With inter-period cost 
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shifting the firm reports $105 million on the income statement for the year it has a cost plus 
contract with the government, instead of $100 million if it does not. Therefore inter-period cost 
shifting can be detected empirically from the firm’s financial statement information. 
 In this paper, we proxy for the government contractors’ inter-period cost shifting using 
their discretionary expenditures. Our second hypothesis is therefore:  
H2: Government procurement contractors’ discretionary expenditure is higher 
in years with a cost plus contract relative to years with only fixed price 
contracts. 
  
 When there is information asymmetry between the contractor and the government, the 
contractor can include more expenditures in reimbursed cost than were actually incurred. Since 
the contractor’s revenue is increasing in cost, more cost shifting will lead to a greater 
profitability. However, the government can increase its monitoring efforts to prevent cost 
shifting. With increased monitoring, the government can decrease the ability of contractors to 
shift costs. As such, we expect the association between cost contracts and profitability to 
decrease as monitoring by the government increases.  
 In terms of increased monitoring, some government contracts are subject to Cost 
Accounting Standards (CAS). Cost Accounting Standards are a set of 19 standards and rules for 
use in determining costs.
4
 A contract could be subject to full CAS coverage (i.e. required to 
follow all 19 standards), modified CAS coverage (required to follow only four standards: CAS 
#401, #402, #405, and #406)
5
, or be exempt from coverage. There are many reasons a contract 
could be exempt from CAS, including that a contract is less than $7.5 million (and the firm does 
                                                 
4
 For example, Thomas and Tung (1992) describe the CAS pension rules (#412 and #413) as similar to tax rules and 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) but more strict than Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) rules. 
5
 CAS #401 “Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating and Reporting Costs”; CAS#402 “Consistency in Allocating 
Costs Incurred for the Same Purpose”; CAS #405 “Accounting for Unallowable Costs; CAS #406 “Cost Accounting 
Period”. 
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not have other contracts over 7.5 million), a contract is for commercial items, a contract has 
“adequate price competition”, etc. When contracts are subject to full CAS coverage, the firm is 
required to provide a CAS Disclosure Statement, which describes in detail the accounting 
policies used to determine CAS related costs.  
 CAS standards can apply for both cost plus contracts and fixed price contracts. For fixed 
price contracts the information subject to CAS could be used in determining the contract price 
(i.e. the government uses the information to set the fixed price). For cost plus contracts the 
information subject to CAS could be used in determining the fixed fee, profit margin, or 
reimbursed costs. To the extent, contracts subject to CAS indicate increased monitoring efforts 
by the government to prevent cost shifting, we expect the association between cost contracts and 
profitability to decrease as monitoring by the government increases. This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
H3: Government contractors with cost plus contracts are relatively less 
profitable when cost accounting standards apply.  
 
3. Research Design  
3.1. Measure of discretionary expenditure Discretionary expenditures are defined as the sum 
of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenditures. We estimate the following model based on the 
entire Compustat sample with data available to estimate the models following Roychowdhury 
(2006). We estimate the normal level of discretionary expenditures as follows:  
DisExpt / Assetst-1 = µ0 + µ1 (1/Assetst-1) + µ2 (St-1/Assetst-1) + εt                                                              (1) 
where,   
DisExpt = research and development expense plus advertising and selling, general and 
administrative expense 
Assetst-1 = total assets 
St = sales 
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Model (1) is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 
observations. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce the 
influence of outliers. For each firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenditure (Abnormal DisExp) 
is the residual from the corresponding industry-year regression. As an alternative proxy for 
abnormally high discretionary expenditures, we create an indicator variable equal to one if the 
residual from model (1) is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise (Abnormal DisExp_Q10) for 
a given year.  
3.2. Hypothesis testing 
 To test our first hypothesis (H1), we adopt the following regression model used in Core et 
al. (1999):  
ROA = β0 + β1Cost contract + β2Lagged ROA + β3StdROA + β4Log sales  
+ β4Log procurement sales + εt                                                                             (2) 
where,   
StdROA = standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including 
year t 
Log sales = the natural logarithm of sales in millions 
Log procurement sales = the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales in millions 
 
We include year and industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. We include the standard 
deviation of ROA over the fiscal year (Std ROA) and the natural logarithm of annual net sales 
(LnSales). We augment the Core et al. (1999) regression model and include ROA to control for 
the time-series properties of performance. Of particular interest to us is the coefficient on Cost 
contract. If contracting firms have higher return-on-assets in years with cost plus contracts, we 
should observe a positive β1.  
To test our second hypothesis (H2), we estimate the following OLS regression model:  
Abnormal DisExp/Abnormal DisExp_Q10 = α0 + α1Cost contract + α2Log assets  
+ α3Market-to-book+ α4ROA + εt                           (3)                                                                                                                  
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where,   
Abnormal DisExp = the residual from model (1)  
Abnormal DisExp_Q10 = an indicator variable equal to one if the residual from model (1) is 
in the highest quintile, and zero otherwise 
Cost contract = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost 
contract, and zero otherwise 
Log asset = natural logarithm of total assets in millions 
Market-to-book = the market value of equity divided by the book value 
ROA = earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets  
 
In all regressions, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce 
the influence of outliers and the standard errors are corrected to control for clustering across firm 
and year (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009). The control variables are from Gunny (2010). Firm 
size, Log assets, controls for any size effects and the market-to-book ratio controls for growth 
opportunities. Return on assets, ROA, is included to address concerns that abnormal discretionary 
expenditures are correlated with performance. Of particular interest to us is the coefficient on 
Cost contract, α1. If contracting firms have higher discretionary expenditures in years with cost 
plus procurement contracts, we should observe a positive α1. A positive coefficient would be 
consistent with inter-period cost shifting and the results in Thomas and Tung (1992).  
  To test our third hypothesis (H3), we augment model (3) as follows:  
ROA = γ0 + γ1Cost contractt + γ2%CASt + γ3%CAS*Cost contractt + γ4Lagged ROA  
+ γ5StdROA + γ6Log sales + γ7Log procurement sales + εt                              (4) 
where,   
%CAS  = percentage of procurement revenue subject to the cost accounting standards  
 
Hypothesis three suggests that the positive association between whether the firm has a 
cost plus contract and performance will be constrained as the government’s monitoring effort 
increases. Our proxy for monitoring is the percent of contract revenue that is subject to the cost 
accounting standards (%CAS). When CAS standards apply, not only specific rules must be 
applied when determining costs but also the firm must produce CAS Disclosure Statement, 
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which describes in detail the accounting policies used to determine CAS related costs. CAS 
standards can apply to fixed and cost plus contracts. For fixed contracts, this could help reduce 
information asymmetry when negotiating the price of the contract. For cost plus contracts, CAS 
could help by preventing cost shifting. Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient on the 
variable %CAS. Of particular interest to us is the coefficient on the interaction between Cost 
contract and %CAS. If firms with cost plus contracts are less profitable when a greater 
percentage of contract revenue is subject to CAS, we would expect a negative coefficient on the 
interaction term, γ3. 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
4.1. Sample selection 
Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample details. First, we retrieve data on all procurement 
contracts between 2004 and 2010 from the Federal Procurement Data System website. Next, we 
map the 21,657,724 contracts to firms available in Compustat and retain 6,098,655 contracts. 
Next, after requiring nonmissing control variables, we are left with 4,912,232 contracts, or 1,137 
firms. Table 1 reveals that 209,278 (4.26%) of contracts are cost plus and 379 (33.33%) firms 
have at least one cost plus contract over the sample period. Panel B of Table 1 describes our 
three samples. Sample 1 consists of all procurement contractors in our sample including 5,745 
firm-years (1,137 firms), of which 1,315 firm-years involve cost plus contracts and 4,439 firm-
years do not. The next two samples exclude firms without cost plus contracts over the sample 
period. As discussed earlier, the government only offers cost plus contracts in certain situations, 
such as when the costs are difficult to estimate ex ante or when the product or service is hard to 
explicitly define ahead of time. As such, firms that receive cost contracts could be different than 
firms that do not receive cost contracts and this self-selection could bias our results.  
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Sample 2 excludes firms without any cost contracts over the sample period and consists 
of 2,201 firm-years (383 firms), of which 1,315 firm-years have cost plus contracts and 886 do 
not. Sample 3 consists of firms with at least one year with a cost plus contract and one year 
without over the sample period. This sample consists of 1,505 firm-years (258 firms), of which 
619 firm-years have cost plus contracts and 886 do not.
6
 Sample 3 allows each firm to serve as 
its own control and mitigate concerns that self-selection is driving our findings. Therefore, we 
use sample 3 in our main analysis and conduct sensitivity analysis using sample 1 and sample 2.  
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
 Panel A of Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of contract revenue and frequency 
by contracting department. The first four columns describe all contracts and the last four 
columns provide analysis for cost plus contracts. The top three departments by contract revenue 
is the department of the army, navy, and air force.
7
 The general services administration and the 
department of veteran affairs have the greatest frequency of contracts.  
 Panel B of Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of contract revenue and frequency 
by 3-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The government 
procurement database provides the NAICS code associated with each contract. The top three 
industries for all contracts by contract revenue are professional, scientific, and technical services 
(541), transportation equipment manufacturing (336), and computer and electronic product 
manufacturing (334). For cost plus contracts, professional, scientific, and technical services 
(541) is the largest and consists of 63% of all cost plus contract revenue. The next largest 
industry is transportation equipment manufacturing (336) which consists of 14% of cost plus 
                                                 
6
 The difference between sample 2 and sample 3 is that firms with a cost contract every year (383 – 258 = 125 firms) 
are excluded.  
7
 Because of data availability prior studies typically use a sample consisting of the Top 100 department of defense 
contracts (by revenue) who are publicly traded (e.g., Thomas and Tung 1992). The department of defense consists of 
the department of the army, navy, air force, and defense (non military).   
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contract revenue. Cost plus contracts are typically awarded when the product or service is hard to 
explicitly define ahead of time. Consistent with this notion, industries with products and services 
that are difficult to specify (e.g., professional, scientific, and technical services) are awarded 
more frequently with cost plus contracts whereas industries with less complicated offerings (e.g., 
merchant wholesalers, nondurable goods) are not.   
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 258 firms with at least one year 
with a cost plus contract and one year with only fixed price contracts. Panel A provides summary 
statistics for sample firm-years with at least one cost plus contract, and Panel B for firm-years 
with only fixed price contracts. Firm-years with cost contracts have significantly higher mean 
and median abnormal discretionary expenditures (Abnormal DisExp) than firm-years with only 
fixed price contracts. Also, both the mean and median return-on-assets (ROA) are significantly 
higher for firm-years with at least one cost plus contract compared to firm-years with only fixed 
contracts. Overall, the univariate differences indicate that firm-years with at least one cost 
contract have and better financial performance and more discretionary expenditures, consistent 
with hypothesis one and two.  
Between the samples with cost plus contracts and fixed price contracts, mean assets, 
market-to-book, standard deviation of ROA, sales, and procurement sales are not significantly 
different. These insignificant differences between the two samples indicate that our sample 
selection procedure that uses the firm as its own control mitigates concerns that firm 
characteristics drive the variation in our variables of interest (i.e. abnormal discretionary 
expenditures and return-on-assets). Lastly, %CAS is significantly higher for the cost plus sample, 
which is expected since cost plus contracts are more likely to be subject to the cost accounting 
standards.  
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5. Results 
5.1. Main results 
 We report the results of estimating model (2) in Table 4. If cost plus contracts are 
associated with higher profitability relative to fixed contracts, we would expect the contractors to 
have better financial performance in years with cost plus contracts. Consistent with this 
expectation, we find a significantly positive relation between return-on-assets and whether the 
firm has a cost contract. Specifically, the coefficient on Cost contract, is 0.008 (p = 0.03). This 
suggests that firm-years with cost plus contracts have higher profitability compared to firm-years 
with only fixed price contracts, consistent with our hypothesis one. In terms of economic 
significance, the marginal effect on Cost contract is 0.762%. The marginal effect can be 
interpreted as the percentage increase in ROA during years with a cost contract. Mean assets for 
the sample is $3.33 million, therefore, firm-years with cost contracts have earnings before 
extraordinary items that is $25.37 million higher than firm years without cost contracts, holding 
all other variables at their mean.  
We report the results of estimating model (3) in Table 5. We use two variables to proxy 
for abnormal discretionary expenditures. First, we estimate an ordinary least squares regression 
with the continuous variable, Abnormal DisExp, as the dependent variable. Second, we estimate 
a logistic regression with the dichotomous variable, Abnormal DisExp_Q10, as the dependent 
variable. The first column reveals a significant relation between abnormal discretionary 
expenditures and whether the firm has a cost contract. Specifically, the coefficient on Cost 
contract, is 0.128 (p = 0.04). The second column reveals a significant relation between whether 
the firm is in the highest quintile of abnormal discretionary expenditures and whether the firm 
has a cost contract. The coefficient on Cost contract, is 0.411 (p = 0.01). The analysis presented 
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in Table 5 provides evidence consistent with hypothesis two, that procurement contractors shift 
costs across time to the government through cost pus contracts. Overall, our results provide 
evidence of cost shifting.  
 Taken together, the results in Table 4 and 5 suggest government procurement contractors 
shift costs to the government when they have cost plus contracts and this leads to greater 
profitability relative to firm-years with only fixed price contracts. Please note two important 
issues when interpreting these results. First, hypothesis two tests for inter-period cost shifting 
since it is easier to observe than inter-contract shifting. Even though we test exclusively for inter-
period shifting, we believe both types of cost shifting could occur. Second, just because firms 
shift cost and have higher profits, we do not necessarily believe this is suboptimal from the 
governments perspective. The optimality of contract form is determined by many factors. Just 
because cost plus contracts may lead to distorted incentives, the appropriateness of fixed price 
contracts is still not warranted.  
 Hypothesis three suggests that the positive association between having a cost plus 
contract and the firm’s financial performance is constrained as the government’s monitoring 
increases. Our proxy for monitoring is the percent of contract revenue that is subject to cost 
accounting standards (%CAS). We test our third hypothesis (H3) and report the results of model 
(4) in Table 6. We continue to observe a positive relation between having a cost contract and the 
firm’s return on assets. The coefficient on %CAS is negative and significant, suggesting firm 
profitability decreases as the percentage of contract revenue subject to cost accounting standards 
increases. More importantly, we show that the relation between Cost contract and ROA varies 
with %CAS in the predicted manner. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction between Cost 
contract and %CAS is significantly negative (γ3 = -0.047, p = 0.08). These results provide 
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support for our third hypothesis (H3) and suggest that as the government’s monitoring increases 
the association between having a cost plus contract and profitability decreases.  
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis  
 For our main analysis, our sample consists of the 258 firms that have at least one year 
with a cost plus contract and one year without, over the sample period (see Panel B of Table 1, 
sample 3). For this sample, the firm serves as its own control. For a sensitivity test, we explore 
the robustness of our results to alternative control samples. We estimate model (2) and model (3) 
using two alternative samples: all contractors (see Panel B of Table 1, sample 1) and all 
contractors with at least once cost contract over the sample period (see Panel B of Table 1, 
sample 2). 
 We report the result of sensitivity analysis of estimating model (2) in Panel A of Table 9.  
For both alternative control samples, we continue to find a positive association between 
abnormal discretionary expenditures and the firm having a cost plus contract. Specifically, the 
coefficient on Cost contract for Sample 1, is 0.0659 (p = 0.05) and the coefficient on Cost 
contract for Sample 2, is 0.0906 (p=0.04). Next, we report the result of sensitivity analysis of 
estimating model (3) in Panel B of Table 9. Again, we find a significantly positive relation 
between the firms’ return on assets and the firms having a cost contract. Specifically, the 
coefficient on Cost contract for Sample 1, is 0.0045 (p = 0.02) and coefficient on Cost contract 
for Sample 2, is 0.0070 (p = 0.03). This provides evidence that our findings that firm-years with 
cost plus contracts have higher profitability compared to firm-years with only fixed price 
contracts is robust to alternative control samples.   
 We also use alternative categorization of contracts to re-run our tests. For the main 
analyses, we refer to any contracts with revenue that is sensitive to the seller’s cost as cost plus. 
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However, Rogerson (1992) describes four common types of contracts employed by the U.S. 
Department of Defense: (1) pure fixed price (2) pure cost reimbursement (3) incentive fixed 
price (i.e realized costs are reimbursed up to a pre-specified threshold level) (4) incentive cost 
reimbursement (i.e. incentive fixed price contracts revert to pure cost reimbursement at a pre-
specified threshold cost level). We estimate model (2) and model (3) on the sample including 
only (1) pure fixed price and (2) pure cost reimbursement and the results are robust.  
6. Conclusion 
In government procurement, cost plus contracts facilitate risk-sharing between the 
government and the contractors, especially when the product or service is difficult to define ex-
ante. It is however also believed that contractors abuse the flexibility provided by cost plus 
contracts and shift other costs to the government to earn a higher profit than deserved. In this 
paper, we use a unique dataset of the U.S. federal procurement contracts to examine whether 
contractors that are awarded with cost plus contracts earn a higher profit, and whether the higher 
profit is associated with cost shifting behavior. We find evidence consistent with cost plus 
contract being associated with higher profitability and greater discretionary expenditures, which 
are indicative of cost shifting. We also find that the government’s monitoring through the Cost 
Accounting Standards helps mitigate this problem. 
Our findings however do not indicate that cost plus contracts are inferior to fixed price 
contracts. Optimal contract form is determined by many factors, such as project-specific risk, 
market competition, contractor characteristics, and etc. Cost plus contracts are necessary when 
the uncertainty associated with the project is high. Further, once the cost plus contract is chosen, 
the contractors can earn an informational rent since the government cannot observe the true cost 
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incurred by the contractor. More stringent monitoring is very costly and can be more expensive 
to the tax payers.   
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Table 1
Panel A: Sample selection
Year
All federal 
procurement 
contracts
Contracts 
mapped to 
Compustat
Contracts 
with control 
variables Firms
Cost plus 
contracts Firms
2005 2,849,310   685,199      495,573      861      32,998        237      
2006 3,723,011   926,604      753,137      916      35,445        247      
2007 4,008,419   1,167,812   972,510      937      33,079        264      
2008 4,391,358   1,335,355   1,114,443   1,000   31,242        237      
2009 3,341,336   1,019,336   799,357      1,016   34,704        231      
2010 3,344,290   964,349      777,212      1,024   41,810        249      
21,657,724 6,098,655   4,912,232   1,137   209,278      379      
Panel B: Control samples
 Firm-years  Firms 
 Firm-years 
with at least 
one cost 
contact 
 Firm-years 
with no cost 
contract (i.e. 
only fixed) 
Sample 1 5,745       1,137       1,315            4,439            
Sample 2 2,201       383          1,315            886               
Sample 3 1,505       258          619               886               
*Includes all procurement contractors
*Includes procurement contractors with at least one cost contract over 
the sample period 
*Includes procurement contractors with at least one year with a cost plus 
contract and one year with only fixed contracts
  
Table 2
Panel A: Contract revenue and frequency by contracting department
Department
Contract 
revenue           
(in millions) %
# of 
contracts %
Contract 
revenue           
(in millions) %
# of 
contracts %
Department of the army 75,820        25% 318,283    6% 40,855        36% 99,010     47%
Department of the navy 68,641        23% 234,272    5% 20,072        18% 24,277     12%
Department of the air force 62,234        21% 144,796    3% 27,682        24% 45,030     22%
General services administration 15,311        5% 1,333,167 27% 1,118          1% 1,047       1%
Department of veteran affairs 13,858        5% 1,135,401 23% 45               0% 183          0%
National Aeronautics and space admin. 10,725        4% 27,088      1% 7,587          7% 8,471       4%
Department of homeland security 9,565          3% 16,292      0% 3,999          3% 4,426       2%
Department of defense (non military) 8,046          3% 46,589      1% 2,154          2% 1,979       1%
Department of health and human services 7,388          2% 42,961      1% 2,895          3% 3,264       2%
Department of the treasury 4,934          2% 24,265      0% 1,799          2% 2,463       1%
Department of justice 3,606          1% 78,920      2% 131             0% 156          0%
Department of the interior 2,925          1% 54,899      1% 371             0% 672          0%
Department of state 2,530          1% 8,684        0% 824             1% 1,249       1%
Department of transportation 2,421          1% 23,819      0% 167             0% 173          0%
Department of energy 2,382          1% 7,209        0% 1,647          1% 1,475       1%
Department of commerce 1,978          1% 18,546      0% 665             1% 1,467       1%
Railroad retirement board 1,368          0% 4,455        0% 1                 0% 7              0%
Department of agriculture 1,327          0% 13,020      0% 935             1% 5,858       3%
Agency for international development 1,011          0% 1,825        0% 682             1% 462          0%
Department of the labor 861             0% 9,501        0% 422             0% 442          0%
Other 3,427          1% 1,368,240 408             7,167       
300,358      4,912,232 114,458      209,278   
All contracts Cost plus contracts
  
 
Panel B: Contract revenue and frequency by industry
NAICS Industry
Contract 
revenue           
(in millions) %
# of 
contracts %
Contract 
revenue           
(in millions) %
# of 
contracts %
Professional, scientific, and technical services 108,586    36% 252,848    5% 71,808      63% 133,448    64%
Transportation equipment manufacturing 57,522      19% 429,885    9% 15,884      14% 21,356      10%
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 35,906      12% 234,442    5% 6,858        6% 8,215        4%
Merchant wholesalers, nondurable goods 17,785      6% 454,306    9% 10             0% 57             0%
Administrative and support services 10,272      3% 32,511      1% 5,680        5% 5,402        3%
Merchant wholesalers, durable goods 7,246        2% 345,302    7% 54             0% 82             0%
Telecommunications 7,202        2% 64,842      1% 779           1% 1,099        1%
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 6,588        2% 133,014    3% 575           1% 691           0%
Machinery manufacturing 6,353        2% 87,216      2% 744           1% 1,229        1%
Air transportation 5,119        2% 8,566        0% 1               0% 29             0%
Chemical manufacturing 4,036        1% 120,157    2% 96             0% 79             0%
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3,859        1% 167,507    3% 61             0% 155           0%
Repair and maintenance 3,825        1% 25,850      1% 1,790        2% 2,483        1%
Electronics and appliance stores 3,205        1% 44,088      1% 130           0% 201           0%
Food manufacturing 2,897        1% 10,249      0% 2               0% 4               0%
Waste management and remediation service 2,770        1% 15,920      0% 1,308        1% 1,758        1%
Educational services 2,765        1% 14,246      0% 645           1% 576           0%
Utilities 2,569        1% 10,032      0% 32             0% 113           0%
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufact. 2,129        1% 29,662      1% 165           0% 260           0%
Furniture and related product manufacturing 2,101        1% 46,645      1% 6               0% 140           0%
Other 7,624        3% 2,384,944 7,831        31,901      
300,358    4,912,232 114,458    209,278    
All contracts Cost plus contracts
  
 
 
The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. Panel A includes 619 firm-years (258) 
firms with at least one cost plus contract. Panel B includes 886 firm-years (258 firms) with only fixed price 
contracts. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels between the means and medians of the 
sample in Panel A compared to the sample in Panel B. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. Abnormal DisExp is the residual from model (1). Log assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions. 
Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. StdROA is the standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log 
sales is the natural logarithm of sales in millions. Procurement sales is procurement contract sales in millions. 
%CAS is the percentage of procurement revenue subject to the cost accounting standards.  
 
 
 
  
Table 3
Descriptive statistics by contract type
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
Abnormal DisExp 0.36 0.00 1.73 -0.22 0.33
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.09
Assets 8.08 8.09 2.10 6.78 9.62
Market-to-book 2.94 2.14 28.19 1.38 3.87
Std ROA 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04
Sales 7.93 8.02 1.97 6.78 9.37
Procurement sales (in millions) 65.96 14.49 174.01 3.32 47.83
%CAS 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75%
Abnormal DisExp 0.18** -0.02** 1.36 -0.20 0.31
ROA 0.02** 0.04*** 0.14 0.01 0.08
Assets 8.13 8.16 2.20 6.66 9.82
Market-to-book 2.69 2.03* 9.65 1.33 3.45
Std ROA 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03
Sales 7.93 8.00 2.05 6.75 9.47
Procurement sales (in millions) 57.08 6.29* 177.19 1.35 30.52
%CAS 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.12 0.00 0.00
Panel A: Firm-years with cost plus pricing contracts for sample of firms with one cost-plus year 
and one fixed control only year (619 firm-years and 258 firms)
Panel B: Firm-years with only fixed price contracts for sample of firms with one cost-plus year 
and one fixed price contract only year (886 firm-years and 258 firms)
  
 
 
Table 4 
 
  
  
Regression results of return on assets on whether the firm has 
cost plus contracts 
 
Pred. 
  
ROAt p-value 
Intercept 
   
-0.030 (0.35) 
Cost contract +  0.008 (0.03) 
Lagged ROA +  
 
0.595 (0.00) 
Std ROA - 
  
-0.372 (0.27) 
Log sales + 0.008 (0.05) 
Log procurement sales  +  
 
-0.001 (0.32) 
      Year and industry indicators 
 
  
Yes 
No. of observations 
   
1,505 
R
2
       0.606 
 
The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. The regression includes year and 
industry (two-digit SIC) indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Two-tailed p values 
are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract, and zero otherwise. 
StdROA is the standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log sales is the natural 
logarithm of sales. Log procurement sales is the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 5 
  
  
 
  
Regression results of abnormal discretionary expense on whether the firm has cost plus 
contracts and controls 
   
Abnormal 
DisExp p-value 
 
Abnormal 
DisExp_Q10 p-value 
Intercept 
  
0.230 (0.24) 
 
-2.991 (0.00) 
Cost contract 0.128 (0.04) 0.411 (0.01) 
Log assets  
 
-0.029 (0.22)  -0.071 (0.22) 
Market-to-book 
  
0.000 (0.54) 
 
-0.002 (0.38) 
ROA 0.268 (0.06) -0.123 (0.74) 
   
  
 
  Year and industry indicators 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of observations 
  
1,505 
 
1,505 
R
2
 
  
0.023 
   Pseudo R
2
           0.114 
 
The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. The regression includes year and 
industry (two-digit SIC) indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Two-tailed p values 
are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Abnormal DisExp is the residual from model (1). Abnormal 
DisExp_Q10 is an indicator variable equal to one if the residual from model (1) is in the highest quintile, and zero 
otherwise. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract, and zero 
otherwise. Log asset is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions. Market-to-book is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. The regression with 
Abnormal DisExp is estimated using ordinary least squares. The regression with Abnormal DisExp_10Q is estimated 
using a logistic regression.  
 
  
  
 
 
Table 6 
 
  
  
Regression results of return on assets on whether the firm has 
cost plus contracts and subject to cost accounting standards  
 
Pred. 
  
ROAt p-value 
Intercept 
   
-0.025 (0.39) 
Cost contract +  0.012 (0.02) 
%CAS -   -0.059 (0.05) 
Cost contract * %CAS -   -0.047 (0.08) 
Lagged ROA +  
 
0.579 (0.00) 
Std ROA -  
 
-0.373 (0.26) 
Log sales +  
 
0.008 (0.05) 
Log procurement sales  +  
 
-0.001 (0.42) 
      Year and industry indicators 
 
  
Yes 
No. of observations 
   
1,505 
R
2
       0.613 
 
The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. The regression includes year and 
industry (two-digit SIC) indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Two-tailed p values 
are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract, and zero otherwise. 
StdROA is the standard deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log sales is the natural 
logarithm of sales. Log procurement sales is the natural logarithm of procurement contract sales. %CAS is the 
percentage of procurement revenue subject to the cost accounting standards.  
 
  
  
 
 
Table 7 
 
 
  
 
  
Sensitivity analysis for alternative control samples 
Panel A: Regression results of abnormal discretionary expense on whether the firm 
has cost plus contracts and controls 
 
Pred. 
 
Abnormal 
DisExp p-value 
 
Highest 
quintile of 
abnormal 
DisExp p-value 
Intercept 
  
0.4660 (0.01) 
 
0.4205 (0.19) 
Cost contracts +  0.0659 (0.05) 0.0906 (0.04) 
Log assets +  -0.0506 (0.00)  -0.0339 (0.07) 
Market-to-book - 
 
0.0004 (0.33) 
 
0.0001 (0.85) 
ROA + 0.2938 (0.03) 0.3139 (0.04) 
     
 
  No. of observations 
 
 
5,754 
 
2,201 
R
2
 
  
0.088 
 
0.061 
 
Panel B: Regression results of return on assets on whether the firm has cost plus 
contracts and cost accounting standards clause 
  
    
All contractors 
  
All contractors with 
at least one cost 
contract  
 
Pred. 
 
ROAt p-value 
 
ROAt p-value 
Intercept 
  
0.1245 (0.20) 
 
0.0044 (0.82) 
Cost contract +  0.0045 (0.02) 0.0070 (0.03) 
Lagged ROA +  0.5511 (0.00)  0.5396 (0.00) 
Std ROA - 
 
-0.2087 (0.08) 
 
-0.4501 (0.17) 
Log sales + 0.0093 (0.00) 0.0061 (0.03) 
Log procurement sales  +  -0.0004 (0.55)  -0.0019 (0.13) 
     
 
  Year and industry indicators 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of observations 
  
5,754 
 
2,201 
No. of firms 
  
1,137 
 
383 
R
2
     0.44   0.57 
 
  
 
 
The sample consists of 1,505 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2010. The regressions include year and 
industry (two-digit SIC) indicator variables. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Two-tailed p values 
are reported in parentheses. ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Abnormal DisExp is the residual from model (1). Abnormal 
DisExp_Q10 is an indicator variable equal to one if the residual from model (1) is in the highest quintile, and zero 
otherwise. Cost contract is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract, and zero 
otherwise. Log asset is the natural logarithm of total assets in millions. Market-to-book is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value. ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Cost contract is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one cost contract, and zero otherwise. StdROA is the standard 
deviation of ROA during the prior three years including year t. Log sales is the natural logarithm of sales. Log  
 
